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Procedural Liberalism in the Service of Ethnocracy 
and as a Space for Resistance: the Case of Dahmash
Dahmash is an informal village of Israeli Arabs in the heart of Israel. Based on 
discourse analysis of legal sources, this paper argues that the state’s democratic 
procedural discourse is used in court to deny and cover over an ethnocratic dis-
criminatory reality. In this setting, the Israeli court can hardly be a helpful space 
of contestation, but at the same time the very pretence for impartiality provides a 
‘crack’ through which the residents continue their resistance. In contrast to the Lib-
eral impartial approach (or pretence) which is implied in the state’s legal texts, this 
paper employs Nancy Fraser’s theory of justice to explore three aspects of injustice in 
the case of Dahmash: distribution, recognition and representation, demonstrating 
how ethnocracy and capitalism work together in a process of dispossession.
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In the heart of Israel, on a very attractive piece of real-estate, live hundreds of people 
in an informal settlement named Dahmash. Although they own the land, they are 
not allowed to live on it – it is designated for agricultural use. The residents’ at-
tempts to legalize their settlement have been rejected time and again for years, while 
all around them farm land has been rezoned for building. The residents believe that 
the reason for this discrimination is their national identity – unlike their Jewish 
neighbours, they are all Palestinians. This paper looks into the tension between the 
liberal and ethnocratic forces in Israel which maintain Dahmash in its informal 
state. 
With about 800 residents and 55 acres, Dahmash is located in the centre of Israel 
between the cities of Lod and Ramla and the co-operative village (Moshav) Nir 
Zvi (Figure 1). Dahmash consists of 130 buildings, including homes and “many 
agricultural and industrial constructions such as sheds, garages and metal collec-
tion compounds” (National Committee for Planning and Building, 2012). The 
land is almost entirely privately owned by Palestinian families who were internally 
displaced and given the land by the state as a compensation for the lands they lost 
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during the Nakba in 1948 (the Palestinian dispossession during the establishment 
of Israel; on this common practice, see: Falah, 1996). Some bought their land from 
its previous owners. Although the residents own most of the land, since 1984 it has 
been designated for agricultural use only, rendering the buildings illegal (Ministry 
of Interior, 2013). As a consequence, Dahmash has no amenities such as water 
and sewage, street lights, electricity, roads and waste collection (ibid). The residents 
have no residential address but some are registered in the neighbouring city Ramla, 
where they receive welfare services and the children attend school. These services 
are presented as a matter of fact by the state (High Court 5435/14:4, section 16), 
although they are also contested and in some cases the local authorities refused to 
provide transportation for pupils or education for an infant with special needs until 
the matters were settled in court (Minor vs The State [2009], AN 2399/08). The 
settlement is therefore informal in the sense that it is not recognised as an entity by 
the authorities, is not connected to basic amenities, and is illegal (Roy, 2005). 
Figure 1: Dahmash and its neighbouring settlements. Source: Arab Center for 
Alternative Planning, 2012. http://www.ac-ap.org/heb/?mod=articles&ID=484.
Note: English captions added by the author.
Since 1996 the state has issued 13 demolition orders on constructions in the 
village, but most of them were held back by numerous court appeals (National 
committee for Planning and Building, 2012) 2012). The residents applied for a 
change in the land zoning and asked to be formalised as an agricultural village, but 
their request was turned down over and over again; not only has the state refused 
on legal grounds, the Lod Valley Regional Council also rejected the residents’ de-
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mand because they “are not farmers and they do not have a land that is suitable for 
agriculture” (Quoted in Paz, 2005). In spite of this surprising comment, the state 
was adamant that the land will not be rezoned for construction and will remain ag-
ricultural. The residents view this as discrimination, considering that since the mid-
2000s the Lod Valley area is undergoing rapid development, with massive re-zoning 
of agricultural lands to residential use just across the borders of Dahmash – in Lod, 
Nir Zvi and Ramla (Ayalon Highway, 2010, Tables 1.4.1-1.4.2:18-21). However, 
the majority of these developments are aimed for Jewish residents. 
In 2006, four houses were demolished but other orders were suspended by the 
Ministry of Interior, on the condition that a new master-plan is presented. The 
residents, with the aid of the Arab Center for Alternative Planning1, presented a 
master-plan for the village but it was not discussed until 2009, when it was even-
tually turned down by the District and National Planning Committees. In 2011 
a Committee of inquiry for jurisdictional boundaries and income distribution2 
was appointed to consider the annexation of Dahmash to Lod, and decided that 
Dahmash will remain informal. In 2015, home demolition still continued. 
Dahmash’s encounters with the law are framed here in the context of an ethno-
cratic regime and an understanding of informality as an integral part of the Israeli 
policy for its Palestinian citizens3 (Roy, 2005; Yacobi, 2007). Ethnocracy is a regime 
type in which a dominant ethnic group “appropriates the state apparatus and con-
trol over capital flows, and marginalizes peripheral ethnic and national minorities” 
(Yiftachel and Yacobi, 2003, 689). Such regimes, while maintaining a degree of 
democratic representation, are characterised by high levels of uneven ethnic segrega-
tion and policies that ensure the domination of the ethno-nation over a contested 
territory. In the case of Dahmash, various forms of injustice are on display. To look 
more closely at the mechanisms of injustice, I employ Nancy Fraser’s three-dimen-
sional model of distribution, recognition and representation (Fraser, 2009), by way 
of dispossession and discriminatory planning policies; political exclusion; othering 
and spatial segregation; and denial of collective rights and identity.
Fraser (2009) identifies three distinct types of injustice: cultural-symbolic, socio-
economic, and political. Cultural-symbolic injustices are associated with domina-
tion, non-recognition and disrespect. In the case of Dahmash, planning documents 
ignore the existence of the village, the residents are criminalised and presented 
as a threat and their collective rights as a minority in a Jewish state are denied. 
Socioeconomic injustice concerns the unequal distribution of material resources be-
tween groups, which Fraser (2009, 58) terms “maldistribution”. In Dahmash, the 
main issue is land allocations, but also services and development plans. These issues 
are prevalent not only in Dahmash but in many Palestinian settlements in Israel 
(Jamal, 2005; 2011; Barzilai, 2003). The third type of injustice is a later addition 
to Fraser’s original model, which relates to political voice or its absence: Dahmash 
is not recognised as a political entity and the Palestinian citizens of Israel are under-
represented in planning committees and other decision making bodies (Bimkom, 
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No date; Jamal, 2011; Jabareen, 2014). Fraser’s analytic distinction between these 
three dimensions of injustice is a useful framework for a rich analysis of Dahmash’s 
complex story.
This paper is in three parts: it begins with a discussion of the way procedural 
liberalism discourse is used in the legal proceedings, and then moves beyond the 
legal claims to a critical discussion of the way the liberal forces - the court and the 
market - are working simultaneously to limit and enhance the ethnocratic agenda 
that impacts the village and its people. Finally, the discussion demonstrates how 
the special position of the court as impartial plays a role in the ongoing “attrition 
warfare” between the residents and different agents of the state.  
THE LETTER OF THE LAW: PROCEDURAL LIBERALISM
This section demonstrates the gap between Israel’s self-representation as a liberal-
democracy concerned with the rule of law, and the ethnocratic conduct of many 
state authorities. Fraser’s model (economy, culture and politics) is useful to uncover 
the aspects which are absent from the state replies in the legal proceeding. 
When the residents turn to the courts they encounter a discourse of law-and-
order, rational planning and impartiality. In political philosophy terms, the state 
adopts “procedural liberalism”: fairness is guaranteed by applying the same proce-
dures to all citizens, regardless of their identity (Thompson, 2006, 46). This univer-
salist view must be “difference-blind” and is not set to recognise differences. When 
the residents ask the state and courts for justice, they claim recognition of their 
marginalisation and discrimination, but the establishment’s representatives insist 
on sticking to the letter of the law and shift the discourse from justice to order and 
procedures. Barzilai (2003) articulates this tension well: "in contrast to the Rawlsian 
(2009) assumption of state impartiality and Israel’s claims to be a liberal democracy, 
Judaism and Zionism are the state's main “historical and ideological tenets in law. 
Yet democracies are obligated to assert the concept of egalitarian 'rule of law' in or-
der to be perceived and legitimized as fair regimes that allocate public goods based 
on equitable public policies. The rule of law, therefore, should not be conceived as 
directly discriminating against minorities" (Barzilai, 2003, 106). Interestingly, it 
is this normalizing pretence that creates a ‘crack’ through which the residents can 
argue their case: the special limitations of the legal system prevent the state from 
voicing the discriminatory nationalist considerations that are openly discussed in 
the political sphere outside the courtroom, both in the executive and the legisla-
ture branches. The following explores one example of the opportunities this tension 
holds for Dahmash. 
An analysis of the legal text reveals two different narratives: the residents’ and the 
state authorities’. These differ in terms of scope, time frame, context, identity of the 
protagonists, and the meaning of the story. The residents tell a story of the distress 
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and suffering of Israeli Palestinians who are discriminated against by a national pol-
icy, and their rights denied. The words distress, suffering and rights appear 15 times 
in the 2014 Supreme Court appeal but are absent from the state authorities’ replies 
altogether. Moreover, the residents stress that their story begins in 1948, when the 
land was given to them by the state to compensate for the loss of their old lands. 
This provides the story with a wider context of dispossession and injustice. 
A very different narrative is offered by the state: this story begins in the 1990s, 
when rapidly growing illegal building was taking place on agricultural lands. The 
criminals, acting in bad faith, defied the law and manipulated the legal system to 
further extend their illegal building, which is against the judgement of planning 
professionals. Indeed, the term “bad faith” dominates the local authority’s legal reply 
to the 2014 Supreme Court appeal, as well as “illegal building” and “delinquency” 
(24 and 17 times, respectively). This choice of words, “when used by government 
authorities, reveals a clearly repressive intention, or hints at a menace” (Durand-
Lasserve, 2006, 1). The state narrative identifies the residents as criminals but hardly 
acknowledges their national identity, as if this is not relevant. Instead Dahmash is 
discussed as a planning issue: professional planning is mentioned 20 times as the 
key consideration. This narrative dominates a large number of formal documents; in 
one case the residents are criticised for presenting themselves as victims:
“The petition in question is not racist but ‘just’ a property petition. The petition-
ers are ‘just’ offenders of the building code and not ‘race’ [sic] offenders. The re-
spondents are not ‘heartless’, ‘jealous’, ‘racist’ etc. but ‘just’ a planning and building 
committee that rejects a plan for mere planning reasons” (Regavim vs Lod Valley 
Regional Council, 2012, 34).    
While this response is particularly blunt, the vast majority of court rulings on 
the matter (e.g. Abu Ganim M. vs The State (High Court of Justice, 2005)2005, 
Sha'aban A. vs The State (High Court of Justice, 2006).  2006; Regavim v The State, 
2012; Subcommittee of Appeals, 2012; Supreme Court 2014, 5435/14) represent 
the same view: the calls of discrimination silenced by calls to defend the rule of law 
and equality. Various judges presented a consistent position that the court must 
prevent the creation of “facts on the ground” and may not delay the execution of 
administrative orders (e.g. Al-Wakili v the state, 12.11.06). Several judges criticised 
the residents for persistently delaying the legal proceedings in efforts to stop the 
demolition orders, and asserted that the constructions must be demolished prior to 
any discussion in the formalization of the village. 
An exception to the state’s and courts’ general approach is a district court ruling 
by Judge Dotan from 2008, who noted that “the fact that (…) the petitioners’ land 
is designated as agricultural land is not predestined. The Planning and Construction 
Law recognizes the possibility of land rezoning” (Neve Atid-Dahmash Association 
v The State of Israel, 30.1.2008). Interestingly, this ruling is one of very few formal 
texts in which Dahmash is referred to as a named village and not in vague or nega-
tive terms such as ‘building in the Lod Regional Council” (Supreme Court, 2005) 
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or ‘land invaders next to Nir Zvi’ (Lod Valley Regional Council, 27/9/05). It there-
fore represents a different political philosophy – a politics of recognition. While the 
authorities deny that a village named Dahmash even exists, the residents’ most ur-
gent claim is to resolve this tension by legal recognition. But will it suffice? Scholars 
of informality are sceptical about it.
Steps of “affirmative justice”, as suggested by Judge Dotan and the residents, are 
legal acts with limited distributive implications: they only promise that the residents 
will legally own their houses. Mere legal recognition, argues Roy (2005), is only a 
starting point – affirmative but not transformative. In other words, a legalist solu-
tion that secures ownership can only be just if it is enhanced by structural redistribu-
tion, political representation and cultural recognition. 
While the residents of Dahmash are certainly aware of the more delicate issues 
of recognition, they have more burning issues to address first: saving their homes 
from the bulldozers. Legal recognition may be the first step on the road to parity 
of participation, but it is nonetheless an important step. At the moment, the resi-
dents lack basic needs and suffer from severely deprived sanitary conditions and a 
constant threat of home demolition. This threat is a typical dynamic of informality: 
“every-day politics of resistance punctuated by the threat of systematic yet episodic 
expulsion and displacement” (Kudva, 2009, 1618). In such conditions, the resi-
dents cannot fully secure the most basic needs of safety and security and therefore 
focus on survival (Merrifield, 1996). Even if this is its only merit, legal recognition 
will remove the threat of home demolition and this achievement should not be 
undermined. 
Moreover, the legalisation model can be dangerously arbitrary. Roy argues that 
calls to allow exceptions to the law position the state as a graceful sovereign “outside 
the law” (Roy, 2005, 149) and therefore extends the state’s power to determine what 
is legal and what is not: “legalisation of informal property systems is not simply a 
bureaucratic or technical problem but rather a complex political struggle” (ibid, 
150). This leads to the political dimension of Fraser’s model, which “furnishes the 
stage on which struggles over distribution and recognition are played out” (2007, 
21). 
THE LAW AND ETHNOCRACY
The following two sections focus on the tension between two sets of power in 
Israel: the ethnocratic political system on the one hand and the (potentially) liberal 
forces of the judiciary and the market on the other; while the liberal camp is alleg-
edly ‘difference blind’ and driven mainly by material interest (the market) or its role 
in a system of checks and balances (the judiciary), the following demonstrates how 
the two camps are not strictly oppositional but rather interact in complex ways. Let 
us begin with the impact of Israel’s ethnocratic regime on Dahmash. 
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The plights of the people of Dahmash started with a political-distributive issue 
when their parents lost their lands in 1948, and continued with discriminatory 
planning policies and land allocations. How was the law used to justify and promote 
ethnocracy? To answer this we start with a quote from Arafat Ismail, chair of the 
Dahmash residents’ committee: 
“We’ve been living in limbo for 40 years… and it all happens in 2014 in a 
state that is allegedly a state of equality but in reality it’s just a dead letter. You 
want us out of here? Cancel the deal you did with our parents and give us 
back the lands you took from us” (Quoted in Elbling, 2014).
Ismail refers to a pivotal point in the dispossession of Palestinians in 1948. The 
law played an important role in imposing and legitimising Jewish political and ter-
ritorial domination in Israel (Forman and Kedar, 2004). A main tool for this project 
was the “Land Acquisition Bill” (1952), which implicitly meant that land could not 
be returned to its owners due to “needs of security and essential development”. The 
bill had two goals: “to establish a legal basis for the acquisition of this land and to 
provide its owners with the right to compensation'' (State of Israel, 1952, 234 In: 
Forman and Kedar, 2004, 820). In the case of Dahmash, this legislation sowed the 
seed for further injustice, because the families were resettled on agricultural lands 
without houses or building permission. Jamal (2011, 122) notes that indeed by the 
mid-1990s – the time the building in Dahmash was expanding – third generation 
displaced Palestinians were struggling “to buy or build a house due to land shortage, 
thus bringing the displacement and land loss issue to the fore”.
Dahmash is not the only Palestinian settlement facing building limitations: 
between 1948 and 1995, only 0.25% of the state’s land was appropriated for its 
Palestinian citizens (Jamal, 2005), a phenomenon which Yacobi terms a “no-plan-
ning-policy” (Yacobi, 2007:34). Moreover, existing Palestinian settlements suffer 
from significantly smaller jurisdiction areas than Jewish settlements--only 2.5% 
of the state’s territory, while the Palestinian population constitutes over 18% of 
the entire population (Bimkom, no date). According to records on the Israel Land 
Authority website, many agricultural lands around Dahmash were rezoned for 
residential building since 1995. For example, just across the railway to the south 
of Dahmash, 35 acres were rezoned for a new neighbourhood in Ramla. Most of 
these developments are, in practice, for Jews only (Ayalon Highways, 2011; Tzfadia, 
2008). It is therefore not surprising that when the people of Dahmash submitted 
their master plan for a new Arab village, the national planning committee declined 
it with the argument that “there is no justification to establish a new settlement” 
(Ministry of Interior, 2013, 21).  
The matter of establishing a new settlement is central to the legal debate over the 
fate of Dahmash, although the state’s legal replies never address the problems of ur-
ban development for the Palestinian citizens of Israel, nor Israel’s Judaization agen-
da. One of the state’s main legal and planning arguments regarding Dahmash is that 
recognising it will not only valorise illegal building in retrospect, but will go against 
the national planning policy: “a guiding principle for this policy is significant pref-
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erence of expanding and strengthening existing settlements and avoidance, except 
from special exceptional cases, from developing new settlements” (High Court of 
Justice 2014, 5435/14:19, section 17). The residents argue that the plan is not neu-
tral and the state discriminates against them as Palestinians, for while the state refus-
es to recognise Dahmash as a new settlement, the Israeli government has approved 
the establishment of other settlements (5435/14, 12, section 60). The state sharply 
dismissed this claim as “not sufficiently founded. The petitioners use the names of 
several settlements that were recently established following a government decision 
in recent years but do not clarify what these settlements have in common with 
Dahmash, which may necessitate similar treatment” (Supreme Court, 5435/14:22, 
section 81). However, a closer look hints that these settlements are treated differ-
ently exactly because of what they did not share in common with Dahmash: all 
these new settlements are for Jewish people only, and are part of Israel’s Judaization 
agenda: Kasif, Hiran and Mitzpe Ilan are specifically planned as Jewish religious 
communities in the frontiers of Israel, where Israel is aiming to increase the Jewish 
presence (Evans, 2006), and Zur Yitzhak is part of the “Stars Plan” to develop a line 
of Jewish settlements along the Green Line.
These distributive injustices resulted from political injustice in the procedures 
that structure public processes of contestation (Fraser, 2007). The planning mecha-
nism in Israel discriminates against Palestinians in several ways: Palestinian citizens 
are severely under-represented in planning bodies, which arguably explains the low 
budgeting for Palestinian settlements and the limits on master plans for Palestinian 
settlements in Israel (Bimkom, 2007). Such policies limit the agricultural land re-
serves as well as the reserves for construction, therefore leading to illegal building in 
the absence of legal options (Jamal, 2005). 
Political representation and distribution are tightly linked. Any attempt to estab-
lish land appropriation policies on principles of distributive justice will clash with 
Israel’s ethnocratic politics. This is demonstrated in a straightforward interview of 
Eran Razin, who chaired the jurisdictional boundaries committee for Lod Valley 
which discussed the suggestion to annex Dahmash to Lod: 
“Many MKs [Members of Knesset] talk in the Knesset about distributive 
justice, but if an objective formula for distributive justice was really in place, 
where would the money go? To the Arabs (…). Unless we want to lead the 
state down a self-destructive path, I do not recommend opening to discus-
sions the borders of all the local authorities in Israel” (Efrati, 2013).
Razin’s words resonate with Fraser’s (2009) analysis: redistribution without recog-
nition is limited because it does not lead to equal participation; likewise, symbolic 
recognition which does not translate into material benefits remains unjust. 
Following the distributive and representational dimensions, the third dimension 
of Fraser’s scheme is cultural recognition. As Yiftachel shows, informality is main-
tained by a contradictory discourse: “on the one hand, professional and political de-
nial (of its very existence, as well as the denial of services, status or legitimacy), while 
on the other a persistent discourse of ‘othering’, and an occasional ‘performance’ of 
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punitive threat” (Yiftachel, 2009, 91). The state’s denial of the existence of Dahmash 
was discussed above, as well as the denial of services and legitimacy. The following 
are examples of othering and criminalization. 
The state recognises Dahmash mostly in a manner Yiftachel et al. (2009, 126) 
term “hostile recognition” – constructing the group as a threat. The authorities’ 
attempts to criminalise the residents encompass a range of offences, from a direct 
consequence of the village’s unrecognised status like burning waste in the absence 
of waste collection services (Ministry of Justice, 2011) to complaints that “the resi-
dents do not cooperate with enforcement officials” (Ministry of Interior, 2012). The 
Regional Council even argued that “in a police activity in the place over 100 illegal 
workers were found. Bigamy is the norm in the place. Severe damage to the environ-
ment; centre for metal thieves and metal dealers” (Sheffer, 2010). This grim picture, 
however, is not supported by the police reports that “there is no exceptional criminal 
activity in the neighbourhood” (Ministry of Interior, 2013, 16). 
Othering is used both to discredit Dahmash’s claims and to maintain a Jewish 
majority in mixed-cities such as Lod and Ramla. “Mixed-cities” are Palestinian cities 
prior to 1948 that became dominated by a Jewish majority and subject to a persistent 
policy of Judaization and segregation (Yiftachel and Yacobi, 2003; Yacobi, 2007). 
When the Committee of inquiry for jurisdictional boundaries and income distribu-
tion discussed the proposal to annex Dahmash to Lod, most parties objected. The 
villagers wanted to be recognised as a village, and the Jewish residents resented more 
Arabs in Lod: one Jewish Lod resident said it will “establish the negative image of 
the city” (Ministry of Interior, 2013, 16), while another was concerned about liv-
ing with “hundreds of people who don't take responsibility on their lives and their 
children's life”, adding that “Lod has just embarked on a new way of development 
and strengthening the Jewish majority, and have a lot to lose from including an Arab 
population that might fail the new leadership in democratic elections” (ibid, 17). 
Below I discuss segregation again as it reappears in an economic guise.
Alongside disrespect towards Palestinians in Israel, the major issue of recognition 
is Israel’s refusal to recognise the Palestinian Nakba – which brings us back to our 
starting point and shows how inseparable distribution, recognition and representa-
tion are. When Ismail offered to strike a new deal with the state he was seeking 
recognition of the injustice done to his family and to Palestinians as a whole. But 
the Nakba and displacement of Palestinians – like other marginalised groups – are 
“totally absent from the planning discourse” (Yiftachel et al., 2009, 121). In this 
political climate, Ismail’s claim is more defiant than realistic and should be taken as 
a call for symbolic recognition rather than a plan for redistribution. 
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ECONOMY: THE RULE OF THE MARKET
This section now turns to look at another liberal force in Israeli society – the 
market economy. Can the market be indifferent to national identities in its quest 
for capitalist accumulation? Residents and activists are concerned that develop-
ment plans trigger demolitions to make way for profit (Tarabut, 2010b; Knesset 
Interior and Environment Committee, 2005a). The main issues involved here are 
plans to construct a road on parts of whose land and a neighbourhood across the 
railway, involving land expropriation, home demolition and cutting the access road 
to Dahmash. The argument here is not that the whole Zionist project is a form of 
accumulation by dispossession, as Torres (2013) suggests, but rather part of a larger 
picture which cannot be reduced to economics; using Fraser’s model, economic 
injustice is analysed in what follows on the axes of distribution, recognition and 
representation. 
Dahmash is standing in the way of development. The land is situated near Lod 
and Ramla, which have enjoyed a real-estate boom in recent years as a result of a 
housing crisis and increasing demands for housing in Israel’s central district, and is 
only a short drive from Tel-Aviv, where housing prices are rocketing. The Regional 
Council told the press that the settlement in Dahmash “prevents the construction 
of Road 200 (…) and prevents economic development for thousands of people 
each morning. The council’s stance is that all illegal structures should be demol-
ished” (Quoted in Persman, 2010). This stance was repeated in 2014 when the state 
claimed that Road 200 is “of essential importance for the development of the city 
of Lod and is supposed to enable, among other things, the development of Lod’s 
northern industrial area” (Supreme Court 5435/14, 3 section 13). 
In planning documents and the local authority’s website, the road is also present-
ed as a necessary step for the development of Lod, and especially the new industrial 
area. The road, promise the developers, is essential to developing more jobs and 
housing (Ayalon Highways, 2010, 74). In the review reports for the road (Ayalon 
Highways, 2010; 2013), Dahmash is mentioned several times, either directly – as 
a scenic hazard for drivers on the road (Ayalon Highways, 2010) – or as a name-
less “land use conflict”, colour-coded as green agricultural land (Ayalon Highways, 
2010, Figure 2). Thus Dahmash’s informal status is used to justify the development 
and explains why all three proposed routes cut through parts of the village (Ayalon 
Highways, 2010). By establishing the space as informal and criminal it is marked as 
“other”, allowing exploitation (Harvey, 2003).  
On the other side of Dahmash, another development is threatening to cut 
through the village: a plan to construct a large bypass linking to Road 200, with 
a series of ramps and a long pedestrian bridge, that according to the residents will 
require the demolition of 17 houses, while denying them the possibility to link to 
the road and get through to Ramla (The Knesset Internal Affairs and Environment 
Committee, 2005a). The residents are convinced that the motivation for this plan is 
the development of “Mitham Maccabi”, a new neighbourhood where 888 housing 
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units, commerce and business is planned (Ramla website). Here, on top of the dan-
ger to their homes, the land that they own will be expropriated to make way for the 
ambitious bypass. The plans for the new developments have been awaiting approval 
for over a decade now, but Dahmash residents are frustrated at the local authority’s 
enthusiasm to rezone this land. According to the Town Plan, the development will 
include rezoning of agricultural and nature areas to dwelling and commerce, public 
building and roads. The residents see this plan as proof that the local authority and 
the regional planning committee are acting in bad faith when it comes to rezoning 
Dahmash.
Figure 2: Three alternatives for Road 200. Source: Ayalon Highway environmental 
impact report, 2010. Note: Yellow - urban development area; Light yellow - rural 
development area; Lined light green - rural area / open rural view; Pink - business 
and industrial zone. Dahmash’s location and English captions added by the author.
While the state authorities present development as essential, these developments 
raise two matters of recognition: ethnic segregation and recognition in collective 
rights. “The activity in the place [i.e. the existence of Dahmash] prevents the devel-
opment of Ramla due to contractors’ unwillingness to build next to the place” – so 
the Regional Council is quoted in a legal response to the court in 2012 (section 
17). The assumption that Arab neighbours will lower the value of the houses and 
reduce the attraction of the development is well recorded in research (Tzfadia, 2004; 
Yacobi, 2003). Other housing developments in Ramla were marketed to army veter-
ans, therefore excluding the Palestinian citizens who do not serve in the Israeli army 
(Knesset Economics Committee meeting, 27 June 2005). This ethnic mechanism 
not only increases misrecognition and disrespect, but at the same time also enables 
privileged communities to maintain and increase the value of their property (see 
Ghertner, 2012). 
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Jamal (2005) raises the second issue around recognition and development. The 
policy of constructing bypass roads around Arab villages and cutting them off from 
major transportation routes falls under the dimension of (mis)recognition: “the very 
definition of Arab expropriated lands as a Jewish national resource is a grave insult 
to the Arab citizens’ identity and their historic and spiritual connection with the 
land” (Jamal, 2005, 158). This policy returns to questions of ethnocratic politics 
that fall under the dimension of (mis)recognition. Here distributive justice is not 
enough, argues Jamal: what is required is restorative justice. 
CONCLUSION
In February 2013, a jurisdictional boundaries committee submitted its recom-
mendations for the informal village of Dahmash to the Israeli Ministry of Interior. 
The committee discussed a proposal to annex the village to the nearby city Lod, 
but following wide objections, it was rejected. Three options remained: formalise 
the settlement as a recognised village; demolish the illegal buildings altogether; or 
maintain the status quo. The committee chose the third option, leaving the village 
in its informal status (Ministry of Interior, 2013, 21). 
The committee’s conclusion is a striking example of the way informality is 
maintained. The story of Dahmash is part of a systemic discrimination against the 
Palestinian citizens of Israel, in terms of land allocations, cultural recognition and 
political representation. More importantly, though, the case of Dahmash is particu-
larly well-positioned to allow a close look into the complex complementary and 
contested relations between ethnocratic and liberal forces in Israel. Beyond the two 
competing discourses presented to the court of an oppressive state or delinquent 
residents stretch complex contradictions that maintain informality in the tension 
between these forces. 
The legal struggle of Dahmash rarely yields success for the residents; the countless 
legal petitions they have submitted raises the question of whether indeed the law 
functions not only as “a force for status quo and domination which must be con-
tested” but also as a “space for resistance” (Rajagopal, 2005, 183). There is room to 
argue that it is, to some extent: the residents have little power to overturn decisions, 
but they effectively delay their execution and voice their experience of discrimina-
tion. In the tension between the liberal and ethnocratic forces, the informal space 
holds back home demolition but never achieves legitimation or security.
NOTES
1. The Arab Center for Alternative Planning (ACAP) is a non-profit NGO that 
represents Palestinian citizens of Israel on issues of planning and development. 
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It was recognised by the Ministry of Interior as a public organisation with a legal 
right to intervene in official planning procedures and file objections to plans.
2. Committees of inquiry for jurisdictional boundaries and income distribution 
play an important part in Israel’s planning process: the committee conducts an 
independent inquiry into changes to local authorities, such as establishment 
of new settlements, mergers of two authorities or granting city status to a local 
authority. The committee then submits its recommendations to the minister of 
interior, who is obliged to explain why they might be declined, if they are. 
3. I use the term “the Palestinian citizens of Israel” rather than “Israeli Arabs”, 
although it is used by some scholars interchangeably (e.g. Yiftachel, 1999, 286). 
The former term emphasises the national identity of the residents and therefore 
explains better the source of tension between them and the ethnocratic state (see 
Rabinovitz, 1993). However, it should be noted that the residents of Dahmash 
themselves often use the term ‘Israeli Arabs’ in the legal documents, in what can 
be seen as an attempt to fit in with the dominant discourse but also to argue for 
a stake in the Israeli state as citizens seeking equality. 
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